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CASES NOTED
stressed the concept that "good citizens . . . must be informed." 2 Hope-
fully, the courts will recognize the realities of today's suburban commu-
nities and allow such activity unless it is certain that there is a public area
which is reasonably accessible. If the courts fail to require this, the right
of expression will be severely restricted.
In the final analysis, these problems may be more imaginary than
real. If any one of the test factors are missing, there is no language in the
holding which should prevent courts from subordinating private property
rights to the first amendment rights which were involved in these cases.
In any event, and regardless of how the courts will treat these factors, the
Logan Valley "functional equivalency" test is dead.
JOHN R. DwYER, JR.
STANDING: A PUBLIC ACTION REQUIRES
A DIRECT PRIVATE WRONG
The defendant, United States Department of the Interior, was in
the planning stages of developing Mineral King Valley into an extensive
recreational ski resort. Plaintiff, Sierra Club, claiming a special interest
in the conservation and sound maintenance of the nation's national parks,
brought suit for a declaratory judgment and a preliminary and permanent
injunction restraining federal officials from approving the development.
Plaintiff relied upon section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act as
a basis for judicial review, claiming itself to be a "person aggrieved"
within the meaning of the Act.' Plaintiff did not allege that the threat-
ened action would affect the club or its members personally, but rather
maintained that its special interest in conservation was encompassed by
the Act and was an adequate basis for standing. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,2 hold-
ing that the plaintiff did not have standing because it failed to allege
any private wrong. The court also held that the plaintiff failed to show
an irreparable injury justifying a preliminary injunction. On writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held, affirmed: A
litigant has standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek
judicial review only if he can show that he has suffered or will suffer
injury, economic or otherwise. As the plaintiff in the instant case had
not alleged injury to itself or its members, it was without standing to
maintain the action. Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
32. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
2. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
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The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the Sierra Club based
its standing, provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."'
The question presented in Sierra Club was whether a party who, as a
representative of the public interest, is seeking to challenge agency ac-
tion in an attempt to protect the environment, is "adversely affected"
by such action so as to have standing to sue without an allegation of
some direct personal injury.
The instant question was not a new one for the federal courts, and
for purposes of this article, the case of Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. Federal Power Commission4 is a convenient point of departure.
In Scenic Hudson, an unincorporated association, consisting of a number
of nonprofit conservationist organizations, was held to have standing to
obtain a review of a decision of the Federal Power Commission which
granted a license to a New York power company to build a hydroelectric
project. The relevant statute under which the plaintiffs claimed standing
was section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, which reads:
[A]ny party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by
an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may ob-
tain a review of such order in the United States court of appeals
for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which
the order relates is located ....
Although the plaintiffs had not alleged any "personal, economic injury
resulting from the Commission's action,"6 the court reasoned that the
Federal Power Act required the Commission to adopt a plan which would
take into account the conservation of natural resources. Therefore, the
plaintiffs could be considered as within the scope of the Federal Power
Act.
In Citizens Committee v. Volpe,7 conservationist associations were
held to have standing to challenge administrative action allegedly dan-
gerous to the preservation of national resources without a showing of
any direct personal or economic harm to themselves. The plaintiffs were
an unincorporated association of citizens who resided near a proposed
expressway which was to run along the Hudson River bank, and a na-
tional conservation organization (the Sierra Club) which had substantial
membership in the area and which had a history of involvement in the
preservation of national resources. The plaintiffs asserted the interest of
the public in the natural resources, scenic beauty, and historical value of
the immediate area threatened, and further claimed that they were "ag-
3. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
4. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1970).
6. Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir.
1965).
7. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
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grieved," for purposes of judicial review, when the Army Corps of Engi-
neers acted adversely to the public interest.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention and held that the
plaintiffs were aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute8 and were, therefore, entitled to review under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.' Drawing upon a concept developed in earlier
cases, 10 the court stated that the plaintiffs were "serving as 'private At-
torney Generals,' "11 and went on to state that
the public interest in environmental resources . . . is a legally
protected interest affording these plaintiffs, as responsible rep-
resentatives of the public, standing to obtain judicial review of
agency action alleged to be in contravention of that public in-
terest.'2
The Supreme Court case of Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp'3 represents a major effort by the court to
clarify the requisites of standing in the area of public law. In Data
Processing, the plaintiffs, who were in the business of providing data
processing services for the community at large, brought an action to
enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency from promulgating a ruling per-
mitting national banks to make data processing services available to
bank customers. They claimed that such a ruling was in violation of
the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962"4 and would infringe upon the
plaintiffs' financial interests.
The Court, in deciding that there was standing, set forth a "two-
pronged" test whereby a party would have standing upon a showing that
first, the plaintiff alleges "that the challenged action has caused . . . in-
jury in fact, economic or otherwise,"' and secondly, that "the interest
sought to be protected ... is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion."' 6 In Data Processing, the plaintiffs were able to meet these re-
8. The plaintiffs relied upon two statutes. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899, section 9, 33 U.S.C. § 401, and Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)
(1970).
9. Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
10. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707
(1943). Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942). In Ickes, the court stated
that the plaintiff need not have a private interest; it is enough that a statute authorizes him
to represent the public interest as a "private attorney general."
11. Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1970).
12. Id. at 105. It should be noted that the standing of the two conservationist groups
was considered separately from that of co-plaintiff Village of Tarytown through whose
boundaries the proposed expressway was to run. Therefore, it cannot be inferred that the
tangible injury which threatened the village conferred any additional status upon the asso-
ciations' claims.
13. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Data Processing].
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970). According to this statute, no bank service corporation may
engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks.
15. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
16. Id. at 153. With this new standard, the Court eliminated the "legal interest" test,
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quirements since they had alleged bank competition which caused them
economic injury (injury in fact), and since the interest sought to be pro-
tected was held to be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
by the Bank Service Corporation Act. The plaintiffs were, therefore,
" 'aggrieved' persons . . . entitled to judicial review"' 7 under section
702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. It should be noted that the
Court did not limit the "interests to be protected" prong of the test to
economic interests, but recognized that such interests may at times reflect
"'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' "values. 8
In the instant case, the Sierra Club alleged that it had, by its ac-
tivities and conduct, exhibited a "special interest" in national resources,
especially the Sierra Nevada Mountains, and that it served as a "repre-
sentative" of the public in matters involving these resources. Moreover,
the club alleged that its "interests would be vitally affected" and that it
would be "aggrieved" by the threatened development of Mineral King."0
On this basis, the Sierra Club contended that it had established its own
protected interest in conservation and, therefore, should be permitted to
act as representatives of the public in order to protect its interests.
It is submitted that the rationale behind the "public action" con-
cept is that administrative agencies, such as the Department of the In-
terior, have the power to make far-reaching changes in society. Often,
powerful commercial special interest groups work hand-in-hand with
these government agencies to bring about these changes, be they bene-
ficial or undesirable. In contrast, the public cannot effectively mobilize
its vast resources to counter every threatened action. Therefore, the need
arises for some organization close to the particular problem to act as a
"private attorney general" in order to present the contrary view to the
courts for their determination." Moreover, where direct injury is re-
quired, no one would have standing to protest even the most outrageous
destruction of virgin wilderness.2 '
In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court did not consider the alleged de-
struction of the environmental and aesthetic balance of Mineral King to
be insufficient as a basis for injury in fact under the Data Processing
which it condemned as erroneously going to the merits. The legal interest test required that
the right invaded be one arising out of property, contract,, or tortious invasion, or be one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege. See Association of Data Processing Service
Orgs. v. Camp. 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
17. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970). As
to the validity of the Data Processing test, see, Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37
U. Cm. L. REV. 450 (1970).
18. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970),
citing Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)
and Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), in support of this statement.
19. Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
20. Id. at 19.
21. Id. at 23.
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test. Rather, the court stressed that such harm must be tied to a dis-
cernible party or to a specified segment of society at large.22
The public action theory presented by the Sierra Club was, in the
Court's opinion, based upon a "misunderstanding" of previous cases
which purported to grant standing in the public interest. To clarify and
settle the point, the Court stated that some personal and direct injury
in fact is necessary to establish standing to seek judicial review, but "once
review is properly invoked, that person may argue the public interest in
support of his claim that the agency has failed to comply with its statu-
tory mandate.""8
The argument that the special interest of the Sierra Club was proof
of its real and bona fide concern, sufficient to place the parties in an
adversary context and to fulfill the injury in fact requirement of Data
Processing, was also rejected. The Court reasoned that mere special
interest in a problem is not sufficient to render the party "adversely
affected" within the meaning of section 702 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. Moreover, such a requirement would in reality be no re-
quirement at all, since any person or group could claim such a "special
interest" with no guarantee that those bringing the action would have
a direct stake in the outcome.24
The decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, while regretfully being too
formalistic and technical, should not be a severe practical impediment
in future environmental law cases. At most, environmentalist organiza-
tions will be forced to carry on proceedings through a fiction of having
a local resident or user of threatened lands as the complaining party. It
is submitted that in view of this possible development, the Court's re-
quirement that injury in fact be some direct personal harm will be a
meaningless obstacle.
Louis X. AMATO
22. 92 S. Ct. at 1364. It should be noted that the Court concerned itself with only the
"injury in fact" requirement of Data Processing, and did not consider any questions re-
garding the meaning of the "zone of interests" test or its possible application to the facts of
the instant case. Id. at 1365 n.5.
23. Id. at 1367.
24. Id. at 1368.
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